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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to identify the determinants of the risk premium on Brazil-
ian government debt traded in the emerging markets bonds. The empirical evidence
presented does not reject the hypotheses that ﬁscal solvency and the size of the public
debt aﬀect the risk premium as measured by the spread over treasury securities of the
Brazilian C-bond.
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Government liabilities issued by emerging market countries are not considered to be risk free
assets since they pay a risk premium above these assets. The risk premium is the diﬀerence
between the yield on a security that has a default risk and the yield on a corresponding
security that is free of such a risk, usually the American Treasury securities.1 Thus, this risk
premium should be explained by the variables that aﬀect the default risk of the security that
has a probability of being in default. The model we use in this paper attempts to explain the
risk premium through the following set of variables: i) market coeﬃcient of risk aversion, ii)
relative supply of the security, iii) degree of government solvency, and iv) degree of country
solvency. We use the most liquid bond issued by the Federal Republic of Brazil, the C-Bond,
to test this model for the period 1996-2002. Muinhos, Alves and Riella (2002) and Muinhos
and Alves (2003) also modeled C-Bond spread over treasury securities, using ﬁscal, external
trade and solvency/liquidity variables. As most of these series showed up to be integrated of
order one, they worked with them in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Here we use a cointegration procedure
based on Johansen´s methodology and found evidence that ﬁscal solvency and the size of
the public debt aﬀect the risk premium as measured by the spread over treasury securities
of the Brazilian C-bond.
The principal instrument used by the market to measure the risk premia for emerging
markets bonds is the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+).2 Figure 1
illustrates the behavior of the indexes EMBI+ Brazil and EMBI+ Emerging Markets, since
1999, when Brazil adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Although Brazil has a high
share in the EMBI+ Emerging Markets (about 28 %), the behavior of the indexes shows
that the risk premium on Brazilian government securities is strongly correlated with the risk
premium on securities of other emerging economies, except for moments of domestic crises
l i k et h ec h a n g ei nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei n1 9 9 9a n d2 0 0 2e l e c t o r a lc y c l e .
1This diﬀerence is computed over securities of equal duration.
2The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded external debt
instruments in the emerging markets. The instruments include external-currency-denominated Brady bonds,
loans and Eurobonds, as well as U.S. dollar local markets instruments. The EMBI+ expands upon Morgan’s












































































































































































This paper aims at identifying the factors that explain the movements of the risk premium
on Brazilian government debt traded in emerging markets bonds. It is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents a model where the risk premium is a function of the debt size and a
set of variables that could trigger a conﬁdence crisis in the sustainability of the public and
external debts; Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical evidence based on
the econometric analysis; Section 4 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
The basic model is based on Dornbusch´s version of the CAPM portfolio selection model
(1983) and its extension to the Italian case by Cottarelli and Mecagni (1990). The former
captures the relative supply eﬀect while the latter introduces the default probability in the
expected yield of a government security.
2.1 Relative Supply Eﬀect
The model is a two-period expected utility maximization for an individual faced with two
securities with random real returns. The random returns on these securities are characterized
in terms of their means and variances-covariances and the portfolio composition can be stated
in terms of the parameters of risk aversion and the structure of returns.
2Let w,r,r∗ and x be the initial level of real wealth, the random returns on the benchmark
and government securities and the portfolio share of government securities respectively. End
of period wealth is random and equal to:
˜
w = w(1 + r)+xw(r
∗ − r) (1)







The mean and variance of end of period wealth are deﬁned as:
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r∗ +2 x(1 − x)σrr∗] (4)
where
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is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and σ2 the risk premium variance.
Equation (5) shows that portfolio selection depends on yield diﬀerentials, risk aversion,
and the variance-covariance structure of the returns. As pointed out in Kouri [(1978a) apud













The ﬁrst is a speculative component and the second component corresponds to the share
of a minimum variance portfolio. It is readily shown that α is the share of the government
3The same results could be obtained if we use a CARA utility function deﬁned over the end of period
wealth and if the returns follow a bivariate normal distribution. In that case, end of period wealth would be
normally distributed and utility function of the mean and variance of that variable.
3security in a portfolio chosen to minimize the variance of wealth.4 Thus, investors allocate
their wealth to a minimum variance portfolio and issue one of the securities using the proceeds
to hold another as a speculative portfolio.
The optimal portfolio share in Eq. (6) is for an individual asset holder. To proceed
to the condition of market equilibrium we have to aggregate across investors, all of whom
share the same information, but may diﬀer in their wealth or risk aversion. Nominal demand
for asterisk-type bonds (government securities) is xjWj.5 Denoting the nominal supply of
government bonds by V , the market equilibrium condition becomes V =
P
xjWj. Using the























now denotes the market coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, being a
wealth-weighted average of the individuals coeﬃcients. Equation (7) can be solved for the















This yield diﬀerential has three determinants. The higher risk aversion, θ,t h el a r g e rt h e
yield diﬀerential. In the same direction works an increase in relative yield variability, σ2.
The third determinant is the relative asset supply. It takes the interesting form of a yield
diﬀerential proportional to the diﬀerence between the actual relative supply, V/
−
W,a n dt h e
share of the asset in the minimum variance portfolio, α.
Following the mean-variance approach to portfolio choice, the increase in the yield
diﬀerential required to accomodate a change in relative supply may also be interpreted
as an increasing risk premium because it oﬀsets the utility loss occurring when investors








θσ2 so that across assets the speculative portfolio
sums to zero.The minimum variance portfolio is independent of risk aversion, of course, and its composition
depends only on the relative riskiness of the two bonds.
5Here xj depends on the investor´s risk aversion and Wj denotes her nominal, nonmonetary wealth.
4move away from the minimum variance portfolio. Clearly, however, this risk premium has a
diﬀerent nature from a default risk premium.
2.2 Default risk
When there is a positive default probability, the expected yield on any security i can be
expressed as E(ri)=rNe
i − piti,w h e r erNe
i is the expected yield in the absence of default




= E(rg) is the expected yield on a emerging
market government security and
−
r = E(ra) is the expected yield on American security,














This equation shows that the yield diﬀerential under the hypothesis of no default is a
function of the expected cost of default, pgtg. The default probability pg is not observed
but it is supposed to be correlated to a set of default risk indicators that could trigger
ac o n ﬁdence crisis. The literature suggests the average maturity of government debt, the
amount of debt coming to maturity in each period, the deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the debt to
GDP ratio as indicators that would capture the behavior of economic fundamentals.6 The
average maturity and the amount of debt coming to maturity are not good indicators because
they are in large measure a consequence of the conﬁdence crisis. The size of the deﬁcit per se,
as well as the debt ratio, does not say much about the ﬁnancial ability of the government to
pay its debt. Instead of using these variables, we assume that the probability of government
default depends upon the solvency conditions for the public sector and external debts. Thus,
pgtg = λ0 − λ1DSG− λ2DSE (10)
where the signs of the coeﬃcients λ1 and λ2 are positive, and DSG refers to the degree
of government solvency and DSE to the degree of external solvency, to be deﬁn e di nt h e
next section. By substitution of (10) into (9) we obtain the risk premium on a government
security:









− ϕ2DSG− ϕ3DSE (11)
where ϕ0 = λ0 − αθσ2,ϕ 1 = θσ2,ϕ 2 = λ1and ϕ3 = λ2.
3 Empirical evidence
The model presented in the last section shows that the risk premiun on government debt
depends upon country economic fundamentals and the relative supply eﬀect which measures
the size of the stock of public sector securities in relation to some benchmark. This section
describes the data and the econometric methods we use to test this model.
3.1 Data
We use C-Bond spread over the American treasury securities as a measure for risk premium,
since this is the most liquid bond issued by the Federal Republic of Brazil in international
capital markets. We use monthly data from January/96 to May/02 (see Figure 2) and this
sample was chosen due to availability of the data.7
Our risk premium measure is supported by a recent study by Araújo and Guillén (2002).
In their paper they decompose three possible measures of Brazilian risk premium (deviation
from uncovered interest parity, C-Bond spread over treasury bonds and deviation from
covered interest parity) into transitory and trend components, following Vahid and Engle
(1993) methodology. They conclude that C-Bond risk premium is greatly inﬂuenced by
the behavior of the trend component. Thus, if this long run component is associated with
economic fundamentals, the authors suggest that these fundamentals would be the main
determinants of C-Bond spread over treasury.
7The FLIRB “C” (known as C-Bond) was issued on 04/15/1994 and has the following characteristics:
Maturity: 04/15/2014; Original value: US$ 7,407,002,000.00; Term: 20 years; Grace Period: 10 years.;
Amortization: 21 six-month payments; Interest rate (six-month coupon): 1st and 2nd years — 4% per
































































































































































































We deﬁne variables that embed public sector solvency condition and external debt
solvency condition of the Brazilian economy to take into account country economic
fundamentals. The solvency condition of the public sector is obtained from the government
intertemporal budget constraint and it implies that the present value of the primary surplus







≥ (1 + rt) ∗ Dt−1 (12)
When interest rates are constant rt+j = rt, output grows at constant rate gt+j = gt and
the rate of interest is greater than the rate of output growth rt ≥ gt,t h ea b o v ee q u a t i o na s
a percentage of GDP can be written as:















Thus, the constant primary surplus that attends the solvency condition is given by:
s
∗ =
(r − g) ∗ d
(1 + g)
(14)
We capture the eﬀect of this solvency condition over government debt risk, measured by
C-Bond spread over treasury securities, building a variable called degree of public sector debt
7sustainability deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual primary surplus and the constant
primary surplus required by the solvency condition :8
dsg = s − s
∗
We proceeded as follows to build this variable: i) For the real interest rate, r,w ec o n s i d e r
two cases which result in two distinct series for this variable. In case 1, r is constructed from
Selic (overnight interest rate) adjusted by IPCA (consumer price index), where inﬂation
is calculated as the mean of this month and the three previous months inﬂation rates in
order to avoid seasonal adjustment problems; in case 2, r is equal to 20.75 % per annum
from Jan/96 to Dec/98 (ﬁxed exchange rate regime) and is equal to 11.80 % from Jan/01
to May/02 (ﬂoating exchange rate regime). ii) Faced by the diﬃculty of calculating a
monthly GDP growth rate, we used the mean of the period, approximately 2.5 % per
annum. iii) Our variable d was deﬁned as total net public sector debt as a percentage
of GDP while s was deﬁned as primary surplus accumulated in 12 months as a percentage
of GDP. Figure 3 shows the behavior of this variable for both cases we consider in this
paper.
FIGURE 3

































































































































































































Similarly, we can derive an external solvency condition for the Brazilian economy,
considering balance of payments´s trade balance, cc∗,r e q u i r e dt om a i n t a i n Brazilian external
8The primary surplus is the net cash ﬂow available to be used by the government to service the debt.
We assume that the price of government debt depends upon the expected value of this cash ﬂow. Thus, the
assumption underlying this variable is that it provides information for this expected value.
8debt in a sustainable path:9
cc
∗ =
(r − g) ∗ de
(1 + g)
(15)
where de is net external debt as a percentage of GDP. 10
In the same way we construct a variable called degree of external solvency, dse,a ss h o w n
in Figure 4, incorporating the condition stated above:
dse = cc − cc
∗,
which measures the diﬀerence between eﬀective balance of payments current account
(accumulated in 12 months as a percentage of GDP), cc, and the one required by the external
solvency condition, cc∗,i ne a c hp e r i o do ft i m e .11
FIGURE 4
































































































































































































We had to construct a proxy variable to capture the relative supply eﬀect because we do
not have information regarding the benchmark used to measure the C-bond spread. We use
the ratio between Brazilian public sector securities held by the private sector and Brazilian
money supply deﬁned by the M1 concept as a proxy for the relative supply eﬀect (see Figure
9Current account was used as a proxy for the amount of output the Brazilian economy would transfer to
foreigners (trade balance).
10This variable includes ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial public and private sectors debt.
11Real interest rate, r,a n dG D Pg r o w t hr a t e ,g,a r ed e ﬁned in the same way we did when we stated the
public sector debt sustainability condition.
95). This is a good proxy for the relative supply eﬀe c ta sl o n ga st h er a t i ob e t w e e nt h em o n e y
supply and the aggregate nonmonetary wealth does not change during our sample period.
FIGURE 5


































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil
The idea behind this variable is that when it increases, asset holders are giving up present
liquidity for future liquidity, and to do so they demand higher interest rates, as noticed by
Martins et al. (1980).12 Since risk premium is one of the determinants of interest rate it
should be positively correlated with our proxy variable that measures the relative supply
eﬀect.
3.2 Econometric Analysis
The variables we use in the econometric analysis are deﬁned as follows: i) SPR =l n ( 1+
spr/100), where spr is C-Bond spread over treasury bonds (in basis points). ii) DSG =l n ( 1
+ dsg/100), where dsg is the degree of public sector debt sustainability (percentage). iii)
DSE = ln(1 + des/100), where dse is the Brazil’s degree of external solvency (percentage),
and iv) TM =l n ( tm), where tm is deﬁned as the ratio between public sector securities held
by the private sector and money supply (M1).
F i r s t l y ,t h eA u g m e n t e dD i c k e y - F u l l e ru n i tr o o tt e s t ,r e p o r t e di nT a b l e1 ,s h o w st h a t ,
at 1% conﬁdence level, we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for each variable deﬁned
above. This means that our variables are non-stationary according to the critical values
12This idea is also implicit in Tobin (1956)’s theory of money demand.
10tabulated by MacKinnon. In order to test the presence of only one unit root, we tested
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the series as well, and the hypothesis that the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
variables has a unit root was rejected.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2
level -2,18 -2,23 -1,87 -0,78 -2,41 -1,85
first difference -6,05 -8,74 -7,77 -7,24 -8,30 -8,25





ADF Unit Root Test
** MacKinnon critical values for rejection of the unit root hypothesis
DSG SPR TM
ADF Test Statistic
* All tests include an intercept and lags were selected by AIC criteria
Before the application of Johansen cointegration procedure, we have to choose the order of
the vector autoregression (VAR). We use the information criteria of Hannan-Quinn, Schwarz
and Akaike as reported in Table 2 to determine the lag lengths. With the exception of case
1, where real interest rate was constructed from Selic rate adjusted by IPCA inﬂation rate,
convergence in terms of best lag was the rule. We also use the Likelihood Ratio test (LR)
for case 1 that suggested 2 lags as the order of the VAR. Taking into account diagnosis tests
(from residuals) which indicated no serial correlation, we decide to use two lags in case 1
and one lag in case 2.
HQ SC AIC
C a s e  1 2212





11After having deﬁned the lag lengths of theVAR, the next step was to test the hypothesis
that there is a long run relationship amongst the four variables through cointegration
procedure. Johansen test results indicated that our variables did not cointegrate when jointly
analysed. Next, we separated the four variables into two sets and we applied Johansen test
to each of them alternating DSG and DSE as proxies for Brazilian fundamentals.13 In the
set that includes DSG cointegration was not rejected as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
None* 0.22 32.30 29.68 35.65




* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Normalized cointegration coefficients: one cointegration equation
TABLE 3
Johansen Test: Case 1
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s)






None* 0.23 30.20 29.68 35.65




* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Normalized cointegration coefficients: one cointegration equation
TABLE 4
Johansen Test: Case 2
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s)






13Once again, Var order selection criteria indicated two lags for case 1 and one for case 2.
12The trace statistics of Johansen procedure does not reject the hypothesis that the series
cointegrate with one cointegration vector in each case at a 5 % conﬁdence level. The following
estimated cointegration equations present signiﬁcant statistics and results that support the











where z is the cointegration error term.
The coeﬃcient of the variable TM supports the results obtained by Martins et al. (1980)
that agents demand higher interest rates when government increases the stock of public debt.
Robust results for the TM variable coeﬃcient suggest that a decrease in the stock of public
debt reduces risk premium, highlighting the presence of relative supply eﬀect in Brazilian risk
premium during the period analysed here. The results for the DSG coeﬃcient do not reject
the hypothesis that when country fundamentals improve, risk premium on public sector debt
decreases. In particular, a positive ﬁscal shock, which increases the primary surplus above
the minimum level required to maintain public sector debt to GDP ratio at a sustainable
path, reduces risk premium.
In the set which contains DSE variable, we were not able to reject the hypothesis of
no cointegration. Although we expected that this variable would inﬂuence risk premium
behavior, the absence of cointegration only indicates that there is no long run linear relation
among DSE’ stochastical trend and other variables’ stochastical trends. Thus we decided
to apply Johansen test to SPR and DSE variables only, where we noticed cointegration
r e l a t i o n si nc a s e1 ,a ss h o w ni nT a b l e5 . 15
14LR test indicated that all coeﬃcients of the estimated cointegration vector are statiscally diﬀerent from
zero.
15VAR order selection criteria suggested two lags as the best speciﬁcation.
Muinhos, Alves and Riella (2002) found evidence that the current account is signiﬁcant as an explanatory
variable to model C-bond spread over treasury securities.
13None* 0.14 17.33 15.41 20.04
At most 1 0.07 6.03 3.76 6.65
SPR DES
10 . 3 6
(0.20)
* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Normalized cointegration coefficients: two cointegration equations
TABLE 5
Johansen Test: Case 1
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s)






Despite the fact that Johansen test shows two estimated cointegration relations among




DSE + z (18)
This equation shows that current account sustainability inﬂuences risk premium level,
but this hypothesis is sensitive to the conﬁdence level chosen.17
Comparatively, our results show that ﬁscal eﬀects, captured by the DSG variable and
b yt h ep r o x yf o rr e l a t i v es u p p l ye ﬀect, are statiscally more robust in relation to changes in
the speciﬁcation of the estimated equation. Thus our tentative conclusion is that a positive
16Again, LR test indicated that all coeﬃcients of the estimated cointegration vector are statiscally diﬀerent
from zero.
17We also tested the possibility of DSG and DSE be cointegrated. In the light of Mundell-Fleming model,
budgetary deﬁcits should induce trade balance deﬁcits. In this case, we applied Engle-Granger methodology,
which consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst one, we estimated long run relations through OLS method. In the
next step, we applied a unit root test to residuals obtained in step 1; if this series results to be stationary,








Clearly, our results indicated a spurious regression. Applying to residuals, ˆ e,au n i tr o o tt e s to ft h ef o r m
∆ˆ e = a1ˆ et−1+ ∈t, we could not reject the null hypothesis H0 : a1 =0 , i.e., residuals present a unit root and
variables are not cointegrated.
14public sector ﬁscal eﬀort would be the best strategy to reduce risk premium on public sector
debt. We do not disregard actions that would reduce the external vulnerability through
current account improvement, but the empirical evidence we present in this paper is not
robust to this hypothesis.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The paper provides evidence that the ﬁscal policy stance, as measured by the primary surplus,
and the size of the public debt aﬀect the risk premium on Brazilian government debt. The
results show that, although current account aﬀects risk premium, the eﬀect of ﬁscal variables
is statistically more robust and quantitatively more important.
These ﬁndings have implications for ﬁscal policy and debt management. In order to
reduce risk premium, the ﬁscal adjustment must be sustained over time, so as to allow for
the proper adjustment in the stock of public debt.
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